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Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith 
 
Chimène I. Keitner† 
 
It is often tempting to read statutes the way one thinks they ought to have 
been written. This impulse, though understandable, can create more problems 
than it solves. Such is the case with applying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976 (FSIA)1 to suits against current and former foreign officials, as Curt 
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have recently proposed.2 
Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the FSIA’s grant of immunity to “a 
foreign state”3 should be read to include current and former foreign officials for 
actions taken in their official capacity.4  Under their interpretation, “official 
capacity” actions would include “human rights abuses” and other violations of 
international law that “require state action,”5 such as the alleged torture and 
extrajudicial killing of a seventeen-year-old “in retaliation for his father’s political 
                                                                                                                          
 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I 
represented amici Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law in Support of 
Respondents in Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08–1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010). 
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 
(2006)). 
2. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, 
and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9 (2009) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity]. 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). 
4. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 13. 
5. Id. at 10. Bradley and Goldsmith use a number of terms to refer to suits they believe should 
come within the scope of the FSIA, including suits for “abuses committed . . . under color of 
state law,” id. at 9, suits for “official acts,” id. at 12, suits for “actions carried out on behalf of 
the state,” id. at 13, “official capacity suits,” id. at 15, and “suits against individual state 
officers who act in an official capacity,” id. at 16. However, even if certain “official acts” are 
deemed to fall within the scope of the FSIA, it is not self-evident that acts that violate 
international law, or the foreign state’s own law, can constitute “official acts” for immunity 
purposes. See, e.g., Brief of Dolly Filártiga et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents at 
18, Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010) (positing that “a court must 
determine, first, what authority a state has actually granted to an official and, second, what 
authority domestic and international law permit a sate to grant lawfully to an official”). 
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activities and beliefs” at issue in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.6 They reject the familiar 
distinction in U.S. law between the capacity in which an individual official has 
acted, and the capacity in which that official is sued, as applied to foreign 
officials.7 Unless a foreign state chooses to waive its immunity, Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s interpretation would deprive U.S. courts of personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction in suits against current and former officials where the conduct 
at issue does not fall within an existing exception  the FSIA.8 This result would 
create a categorical barrier to most human rights sui beyond those contemplated 
by existing immunities and other applicable restrictions. 
Bradley and Goldsmith appeal to three basic sources of support for their 
proposal: (1) logic, (2) policy, and (3) international law. In this brief essay, I 
examine each of these sources in turn. I conclude that these sources do not 
support reading the FSIA to encompass suits against natural persons, even when 
such persons have acted under color of foreign law.Unless the Supreme Court 
decides to write its own statute when it decides Samantar v. Yousuf,9 or Congress 
enacts a comprehensive statute regulating foreign officials’ immunities, current 
and former foreign officials should continue to invoke the well-established 
sources of immunity that they already have under relevant treaties, customary 
international law, and the common law,10 without creating the myriad problems 
associated with forcing individuals into the ill-fitting text of the FSIA.  
Stated briefly, the observation that “a state acts through individuals”11 
does not support Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal a a matter of logic, because 
both U.S. and international law attribute personal responsibility to individuals for 
certain types of illegal conduct precisely because they engage in such conduct 
under color of law. When a certain criterion defines conduct as illegal, it does not 
make sense for that same criterion to place individuals who have engaged in that 
conduct categorically beyond the reach of U.S. courts. Nor do policy 
considerations support Bradley and Goldsmith’s proposal. There are at least three 
reasons for this: the FSIA was not designed to include individuals, reading it to do 
so would conflict with the Torture Victim Protection Act, and various specialized 
immunities and other non-statutory doctrines already afford substantial 
                                                                                                                          
 
6. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
7. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991) (indicating that, in a § 1983 action, “the 
phrase ‘acting in their official capacities’ is best understood as a reference to the capacity in 
which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged 
injury.”). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and 
Domestic Officer Suits, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 137 (2009) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Domestic Officer Suits] (rejecting this approach in suits against foreign officials).  
8. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 22; see also 28 U.S.C. § 
1605 (2006) (listing exceptions). 
9. No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010).  
10. See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
11. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 13. 
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protections to foreign officials and to the interests of foreign states in U.S. courts. 
Finally, neither international treaties nor customary international law require 
treating all “official capacity suits” as suits against the state itself, without regard 
to the conduct at issue. It would be anomalous to find that international law 
categorically prevents states from holding individuals accountable for universally 
condemned violations of international law. 
LOGIC 
Logic does not support Bradley and Goldsmith’s reading of the FSIA 
because both U.S. and international law make individuals liable for engaging in 
certain types of conduct precisely because they act under color of law. It would be 
self-defeating for the same criterion to both create and preclude liability. 
Before Samantar reached the Supreme Court this term, courts and litigants 
had assumed that, if the FSIA could include suits against individual officials, this 
was because a given official qualified as an “agency or instrumentality” of the 
foreign state under § 1603(b). However, as Chief Justice Roberts noted during 
oral argument in Samantar, the FSIA “says that an agency or instrumentality is an 
entity [and] we usually don’t think of individuals as being entities.”12 
The decision most often cited for the “agency or instrumentality” approach 
is that of the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank.13 The 
Chuidian court observed that “[o]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only 
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 
agent.”14 The Chuidian court mistakenly believed that the only alternatives to 
reading the FSIA to include individuals were either to find no immunity for 
individuals, or to give the State Department complete discretion over 
determinations of individual immunity.15 The court held that individuals acting in 
their official capacity are agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states in order to 
avoid these results. 
Bradley and Goldsmith share some of the Chuidian court’s concerns, but 
they propose an alternative solution. Instead of viewing individuals as agencies or 
instrumentalities of foreign states, they argue that “[s]ince a state acts through 
individuals, a suit against an individual official for actions carried out on behalf of 
                                                                                                                          
 
12. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Samantar v. Yousuf, No. 08-1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 
2010). 
13. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 ( th Cir. 1990). 
14. Id. at 1101–02 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). 
15. Although the role of the Executive Branch is beyond the scope of this response, it bears 
noting that the Executive Branch is responsible for determining an individual’s entitlement to 
status-based immunity, because the Executive is charged with accrediting diplomats and 
recognizing foreign heads of state. By contrast, the views of the Executive Branch are 
important—but not dispositive—in determining the scope of conduct-based immunity. 
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the state is in reality a suit against the foreign state [itself] . . . .”16 Accordingly, 
they contend that suits against current or former foreign officials for actions taken 
in their official capacity (which they define broadly to include all actions “carried 
out on behalf of the state”) are suits against the state “even if that is not how the 
plaintiff captions his or her complaint.”17  
Their appeal to logic proceeds as follows: (A) states can only act through 
individuals, so (B) a suit against an individual for actions taken in his or her 
official capacity must be a suit against the state, not against the individual. 
Although (A) is uncontroversial, (B) does not follow as a logical result. Notably, a 
similar observation about the relationship between state action and individual 
action led to a strikingly different result at Nuremberg, where the tribunal 
concluded that because “[c]rimes against internatiol law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities,” it was both appropriate nd necessary to impose 
individual responsibility on individuals who had acted on behalf of the Nazi 
regime.18 Imposing individual responsibility for acts that might also entail state 
responsibility is not illogical because, as the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
recognize, state responsibility and individual responsibility are not mutually 
exclusive.19 Were it otherwise, any would-be international law violator could 
receive a “free pass” by using state authority to commit the violation. This would 
turn the very premise of much international human rights law on its head—
namely, that certain actions rise to the level of international law violations 
precisely because they involve the abuse of state authority.20 
When an individual is a named defendant, the question is how to 
determine when the state, and not the individual, is the real party in interest. The 
FSIA provides no guidance on this question. If the state is the real party in 
interest, the individual defendant can properly invoke common law immunity. 
There is no need to treat the action as if it had been brought under the FSIA. 
Courts in other countries have approached the problem of determining the 
real party in interest by focusing on the nature of the relief sought. For example, 
the Irish Supreme Court denied immunity to a Spanish colonel in an action for 
damages arising from a contract to carry horses from Dublin to Lisbon for use by 
                                                                                                                          
 
16. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 13. 
17. Id. at 5.  
18. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL M ILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, at 223 (1947). 
19. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter ationally Wrongful 
Acts, art. 58, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third 
Session, ¶ 76, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).  
20. The paradigmatic example of this is torture, which by definition must be “inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity.” United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 102 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85. 
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the Spanish Army because “in the proceedings, as framed, no relief is sought 
against any person save the appellant. He is sued in his personal capacity and . . . 
any judgment . . . against him, will bind merely the appellant personally, and . . . 
cannot be enforced against any property save that of the appellant.”21 The Court in 
this case thus recognized a meaningful distinction between a suit against an 
individual official and a suit against the state, even where the state might 
ultimately indemnify the individual.22 
This focus on the nature of the requested relief is reflected in other foreign 
cases from various periods, including those cited by Bradley and Goldsmith. For 
example, a German court dismissed a suit against a current U.K. official for 
injunctive relief that would have compelled the United Kingdom to act contrary to 
a treaty obligation.23 A U.K. court dismissed a suit against companies acting as 
the agents of a foreign government in London for money damages from the state 
treasury based on common law immunity and because the foreign state was a 
necessary party.24 A U.K. court also dismissed a suit against a current official who 
had no plausible connection to the alleged misconduct because he was not in 
office when the conduct occurred.25 These cases do not support Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s claim that suits seeking to impose liabi ty directly on individuals for 
torture and extrajudicial killing come within the scope of the FSIA, or that the 
defendants in such suits are entitled to immunity under the FSIA by virtue of the 
“official” nature of their conduct. 
It may be true, in some metaphysical sense, that a state can only act 
through individuals. But it does not follow that ind viduals who act on behalf of 
the state should be treated as the state itself for all purposes. As Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht observed in 1951, “the state always act s a public person. It cannot 
act otherwise. In a real sense all acts jure gestionis [commercial activities] are acts 
                                                                                                                          
 
21. Saorstat & Cont’l Steamship Co. v. De las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291, 300, reprinted in 12 
I.L.R. 97, 98 (Ir.). 
22. Id. at 301 (finding that the possibility of indemnification by the Spanish Government did not 
turn the suit into one against the Government). But see Jaffe v. Miller, [1993] 13 O.R. (3d) 
745, 759 (C.A.) (Can.) (giving greater weight to indemnification); Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 148 (same). 
23. Church of Scientology Case, 65 I.L.R. 193 (BGH 1978) (F.R.G.) (dismissing suit for 
injunction against current head of New Scotland Yard to prevent compliance with a document 
request from Germany under a 1961 Agreement), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 15 n.22. 
24. Twycross v. Dreyfus, (1877) 5 Ch.D. 605 (C.A.) (Eng.) (finding lack of jurisdiction over 
claim to proceeds of the sale of guano owned by the Republic of Peru because the Republic 
was a necessary party as the owner of the guano), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, Domestic 
Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 142 n.20. 
25. Propend Finance Pty. Ltd. v. Sing, 111 I.L.R. 611, 662 (C.A. 1997) (Eng.) (finding no basis 
for suing current Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police Force for an improper fax 
sent by Australian diplomat, where the Commissioner i  office at the time the fax was sent 
had died by the time of suit).  
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jure imperii [sovereign activities].”26 However, as Lauterpacht emphasized and 
the FSIA reflects, “the logical consequence” of that observation is not necessarily 
the grant of absolute immunity for commercial activities.27 Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court held in Hafer v. Melo, it makes no sense for the very criteria that 
define a violation (such as a requirement that the def ndant acted under color of 
law) to shield the defendant from legal consequences.28 Bradley and Goldsmith’s 
proposal compels this illogical result. 
POLICY 
Considerations of policy do not support Bradley and Goldsmith’s 
proposal. The reading they propose of the FSIA does n t fit into the design of the 
statute and would substantially negate the Torture Victim Protection Act. 
Furthermore, various specialized immunities and other common law doctrines 
already provide protection for foreign officials, and for the interests of foreign 
states, when such protection is warranted.  
The omission of foreign officials from the FSIA was not an oversight. 
Rather, Congress was concerned primarily with regulating suits against foreign 
states and state-owned enterprises, not suits against individuals. Immunity for 
state entities had been governed since 1952 by the standards set out in the so-
called Tate Letter, which differentiates between sovereign activities, for which 
state entities are deemed immune, and commercial activities, for which they are 
not.29 Congress enacted the FSIA to codify the Tate Letter and give the courts 
authority over its application.30 
Given the reasons for which Congress enacted the FSIA, it is not difficult 
to see why suits brought against individuals fall outside its scope, even when 
those suits involve actions taken in an “official capacity.” An authoritative 
compilation of pre-FSIA immunity decisions, published at the time of the FSIA’s 
enactment, makes clear that “the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not deal 
with the immunity of individual officials, but only that of foreign states . . . .”31 
Former State Department Acting Legal Adviser Mark Feldman, who participated 
in drafting the FSIA, later stated that “[i]t was never the intention of the drafters 
                                                                                                                          
 
26. H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 220, 224 (1951).  
27. Id. 
28. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1991). 
29. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting 
Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 984–85 (1952). 
30. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cen. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–89 (1983). 
31. See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Dep’t of State, May 1952 to January 1977, 1977 
DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT’L L. 1017, 1020 (appendix). 
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of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to encompass [foreign officials].”32 This 
has also been the consistent position of the U.S. government.33  
Rewriting history to include suits against individuals within the text of the 
FSIA, as Bradley and Goldsmith propose, would create numerous problems. 
Although these problems are not the main focus of this response, three bear 
mentioning. First, the FSIA states that “a foreign state shall be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States” exc pt as provided in the FSIA 
itself.34 The FSIA does not distinguish between civil and criminal jurisdiction, 
and it does not contain an exception for criminal proceedings. Therefore, reading 
suits against individuals into the FSIA would inadvertently confer both civil and 
criminal immunity on individuals for their non-commercial activities. This could 
interfere with the United States’s ability to prosecute individuals involved in 
offenses carried out with the tacit or explicit approval of a foreign state.35 
Second, reading suits against individuals into the text of the FSIA would 
make the commercial activities exception to immunity applicable to all suits 
involving actions taken in an “official capacity,” including suits against sitting 
heads of state. This would prevent U.S. courts from recognizing the absolute 
immunity of sitting heads of state, since such immunity was not codified in an 
international agreement to which the United States wa a party at the time the 
FSIA was enacted (which is the only recognized basis for derogations from the 
textual provisions of the FSIA).36 
 Third, 28 U.S.C. § 1608, which establishes the method of service of 
process for suits brought under the FSIA, contains no provision for service of 
process on individuals sued in their official capacity, or individuals sued in their 
individual capacity for acts performed on the state’s behalf.37 It is therefore 
unclear what steps a plaintiff would need to take to secure personal jurisdiction 
over an individual defendant if the suit is governed by the FSIA. Moreover, 
Bradley and Goldsmith’s reading of the FSIA would pose problems for 
defendants as well, since the FSIA broadly equates service of process with 
personal jurisdiction without reference to a minimum contacts requirement.38 It is 
therefore possible that treating claims against indiv duals as coming within the 
                                                                                                                          
 
32. Foreign Governments in United States Courts: Discusion, 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 276 
(1991) (statement by Mark Feldman).  
33. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Samantar v. Yousuf, 
No. 81–1555 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2010); Statement of Interest of the United States, Chuidian 
v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, No. 86–2255 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 21, 1988).  
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (emphasis added). 
35. See United States v. Emmanuel, 2007 WL 2002452 at *12-13 (S.D. Fla., July 5, 2007) (order 
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment) (rejecting sovereign immunity defense 
to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2340 for torture in Liberia). 
36.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). 
37. Compare FED. R. CIV . P. 4(i)(2)–(3) with 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2006). 
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2006). 
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FSIA’s definition of a “foreign state” could raise due process concerns. These 
problems arise because those who drafted and enacted the FSIA did not intend it 
to apply to suits against individuals. 
Reading the FSIA as it was actually written, to apply to states and not to 
individuals, reflects Congress’s own understanding, as a contrary reading not only 
does not fit into the design of the FSIA but also substantially negates the 
subsequently enacted Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).39 The 
TVPA provides a cause of action to U.S. citizens and liens for torture or 
extrajudicial killing against an individual defendant who acted “under actual or 
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”40 In order for Bradley 
and Goldsmith’s interpretation of the FSIA to be plausible, one must assume that 
Congress engaged in a futile exercise of creating a specific cause of action for a 
class of activity that is, by definition, immune from suit by virtue of having been 
performed under color of foreign law. In interpreting potentially conflicting 
statutes, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a court “must read the statutes to 
give effect to each if [it] can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.”41 
Reading the FSIA to bar suits against current or former officials for torture and 
extrajudicial killing would violate this basic principle of statutory interpretation. 
In addition to these tensions with surrounding statutory law, Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s reading of the FSIA is also largely superfluous, because it neglects 
well established immunities for individuals outside the FSIA. Foreign officials 
already benefit from a host of specialized immunities under relevant treaties, 
customary international law, and the common law. As Bradley and Goldsmith 
indicate, international law differentiates between status-based (ratione personae) 
and conduct-based (ratione materiae) immunity from the jurisdiction of national 
courts.42 Status-based immunities, such as the immunity afforded sitting heads of 
state as a matter of customary international law,43 and the immunity afforded 
diplomats under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,44 are absolute 
during an official’s tenure in office. Courts will, accordingly, dismiss suits 
brought against current heads of state or current diplomats. They will also dismiss 
suits against defendants who are served while they ar  present in the United States 
to conduct official government business as part of a “special diplomatic mission,” 
                                                                                                                          
 
39. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codifie  at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
40. Id. § 2(a). 
41. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 
551(1974)). 
42. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 18. 
43. See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004), cited in Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 19 n.33; see also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb. 14) (holding that an incumbent 
foreign minister is entitled to status-based immunity). 
44. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 96. 
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as determined by the State Department.45  Conduct-based immunity is both 
narrower and broader than status-based immunity: it is narrower, because it only 
provides immunity for specific acts (such as those performed in the exercise of 
diplomatic or consular functions), but it is also broader, because it endures even 
after an individual has left office.46 If Congress had sought to consolidate all these 
types and sources of immunity into one overarching statute, the 1976 FSIA is not 
what it would have enacted.  
The United States can keep human rights suits within appropriate limits 
without shoehorning individuals into the ill-fitting text of the FSIA. Under the 
TVPA and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), U.S. courts can only assert subject 
matter jurisdiction over a small number of universally recognized international 
law violations.47 These constraints mean that there is a limited class of potential 
defendants worldwide, few of whom are present in the United States at any given 
time and thus subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The political 
question doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and procedural determinations such as 
whether the state is a necessary party also provide mechanisms for dismissing 
TVPA and ATS suits when warranted to protect diplomatic relations and 
minimize interference with the conduct of foreign affairs.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Bradley and Goldsmith claim that “the United States would violate 
international law if it failed to confer immunity on state officials for their official 
acts committed while in office.”48 However, neither international treaties nor 
customary international law require treating all “official capacity suits” as suits 
against the state, without regard to the conduct at issue. It would be passing 
strange to find that international law categorically prevents states from holding 
individuals accountable for universally recognized violations of international law. 
Bradley and Goldsmith invoke the U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property because it defines “state” to include 
“representatives of the State acting in that capacity.”49 However, the United States 
                                                                                                                          
 
45. See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States at 11 n.9, Li 
Weixum v. Bo Xilai, Civ. No. 04-0649 (D.D.C. filed July 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/98832.pdf (suggesting immunity from service 
of process for invitee of the Executive branch but emphasizing that “[s]pecial mission 
immunity would not . . . encompass all foreign official travel”). 
46. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 44, art. 39(2); Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations art. 53(4), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T  77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (construing the 
ATS). 
48. Bradley & Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, supra note 2, at 16. 
49. Id. at 15 (citing United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property art. 2(1)(b)(iv), opened for signature Dec. 16, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 803). 
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has not signed the Convention and is unlikely to do so because it differs 
substantially from the terms of the FSIA.50 Moreover, this Convention, which 
deals largely with state liability for commercial transactions, has not yet obtained 
the thirty ratifications required to enter into force. Absent a basis in treaty law, 
Bradley and Goldsmith’s claim must rely on their interpretation of customary 
international law, which “results from a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”51 However, although various 
national courts have found individual foreign officials immune for various types 
of conduct in various circumstances, there is no “general and consistent” practice 
of states granting conduct-based immunity to foreign officials—let alone former 
foreign officials—for conduct such as torture and extrajudicial killing. In fact, 
there is significant practice to the contrary. 
Particularly since World War II, states have created and supported 
international courts that explicitly reject official capacity defenses to international 
law violations within their jurisdiction.52 As the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia has emphasized, “those responsible for [conduct 
within the tribunal’s jurisdiction] cannot invoke immunity from national or 
international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their 
official capacity,” just as spies “although acting as State organs, may be held 
personally accountable for their wrongdoing.”53  This principle of individual 
responsibility is not confined to international proceedings. Numerous domestic 
statutes reject official capacity defenses to international crimes such as torture, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity, and allow injured parties to seek civil 
                                                                                                                          
 
50. See David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 194, 205 (2005) (noting that the Convention does not contain 
exceptions for expropriation or terrorism); see also id. at 210–11 (noting other U.S. 
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(1987). Customary international law is binding on the United States, although academic 
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for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 41 (29 Oct., 1997), 
reprinted in [1997] 110 I.L.R. 607. 
Spring 2010 Officially Immune? 11 
 
damages as part of criminal proceedings.54  Ignoring the established lack of 
immunity for these crimes in international courts and in certain domestic 
proceedings neglects an important aspect of state pr ctice in this area. 
Early cases cited by Bradley and Goldsmith to illustrate the “rule” of 
immunity that “prevailed” in the United States55 actually show the absence of 
blanket immunity. As early as 1794, Attorney General William Bradford was 
asked to opine on a suit brought in Pennsylvania state court against General 
George Henri Victor Collot for his conduct while Governor and Commander in 
Chief of the French colony of Guadeloupe. Bradford declined to intervene on 
France’s behalf, stating that “[w]ith respect to his suability, [the former Governor] 
is on a footing with any other foreigner (not a public minister) who comes within 
the jurisdiction of our courts.”56 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that 
the defendant could be held to bail, whether or not he would ultimately be found 
liable for his conduct.57 Three years later, Attorney General Charles Lee stated 
that, even though “a person acting under a commission from the sovereign of a 
foreign nation is not amenable” in U.S. court “for what he does in pursuance of 
his commission,” the claims brought in Virginia against British privateer Henry 
Sinclair were “entitled to a trial according to law . . . .”58 In 1841, the New York 
Supreme Court (the highest court of general jurisdiction sitting in New York at 
that time) rejected the claim to immunity of Alexander McLeod, a British subject 
and former deputy sheriff of the Niagara District in Upper Canada who was 
implicated in the 1837 attack on the steamboat C roline. McLeod had been 
arrested and charged with the crimes of arson and mur er, and civil claims were 
also brought against him. The court, which included future U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Samuel Nelson, held that Britain had not “placed the offenders above the 
law, and beyond our jurisdiction, by adopting and approving [the defendant’s] 
crime.”59  
Bradley and Goldsmith attempt to distinguish these arly opinions on the 
grounds that they involved state court proceedings, and were thus beyond the 
reach of the federal government.60 However, had a principle of immunity for 
                                                                                                                          
 
54. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45, 
71 n. 110 (2007) (enumerating domestic statutes). 
55. Bradley & Goldsmith, Domestic Officer Suits, supra note 7, at 142–43. 
56. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794). 
57. Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247, 248 (1796). 
58. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797). A correction was made to the Article on September 29, 2010. The 
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“official acts” been well established in international law or common law at the 
time, presumably at least one of these courts would have applied it. 
Bradley and Goldsmith also overstate the case when t y assert that 
“[m]any courts around the world have concluded that the international law of 
foreign sovereign immunity applies to suits against officials acting in an official 
capacity.”61  Although courts have certainly found immunity in a v riety of 
contexts, some of these cases involved suits for injunctive relief, suits for 
monetary relief from the state itself, or suits against individuals who had no 
plausible personal connection to the alleged misconduct.62 Others involved the 
application of domestic immunity statutes whose text, unlike that of the FSIA, 
could plausibly be read to encompass individuals.63 None involved the direct 
application of customary international law principles of immunity to allegations 
of torture and extrajudicial killing. For example, in Zoernsch v. Waldock, a U.K. 
appeals court found that the current Secretary of the European Commission of 
Human Rights was entitled to immunity under an Order of the Council of Europe 
in a suit alleging that he had presented an edited version of the plaintiff’s claim, 
rather than the entire claim in plaintiff’s own words, to the Commission.64 In 
Zoernsch, Lord Diplock, the “eminent British judge”65 whose speech Bradley and 
Goldsmith rely on, cited Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad on the question of 
conduct-based immunity.66 In Rahimtoola, the House of Lords found that a suit 
against the former High Commissioner of Pakistan was b rred by sovereign 
immunity because it involved determining Pakistan’s entitlement to funds held in 
a London bank account. The House of Lords’s decision in Rahimtoola thus 
typifies those cases that name individual defendants bu  are appropriately barred 
by principles of immunity because “the effect of exercising jurisdiction [over the 
individual defendant] would be to enforce a rule of law against the state”.67  
Unlike the conduct at issue in Zoernsch and Rahimtoola, the alleged 
conduct at issue in ATS cases such as Filártiga and TVPA cases such as 
Samantar entails personal responsibility as a matter of international law. National 
courts can, in appropriate circumstances, impose legal consequences for such 
conduct. This is true even though the state might also bear responsibility, and 
even though the state itself might be immune from suit in a foreign court. 
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The U.K. House of Lords’s analysis in Jones v. Saudi Arabia does not 
alter this conclusion, because that case asked whether Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (which provides for access to courts) requires 
finding an implied exception to immunity under the U.K. State Immunity Act.68 
The House of Lords concluded that it does not, and the petitioners in that case 
have sought a hearing before the European Court of Human Rights. But even if 
the European Court of Human Rights agrees with the House of Lords, it would 
not mean that customary international law requires granting conduct-based 
immunity for torture under the FSIA, as Bradley and Goldsmith argue.69 Reading 
the House of Lords’s decision to require granting immunity for torture under the 
FSIA ignores that, in the U.K., the burden is on the plaintiff to show that 
international law requires an exception to the immunity created by a domestic 
statute. In the United States, by contrast, the burden is on the defendant to show 
that immunity exists in the first place.  
CONCLUSION 
Bradley and Goldsmith take issue with human rights suits because they 
have “no basis in any . . . act of state consent.”70 What this neglects, however, is 
the exclusive and absolute jurisdiction of the United States over its own 
territory.71 Peña-Irala overstayed his visa and was living in Brooklyn, New York. 
Samantar has lived in Fairfax, Virginia since the 1990s. Applying the FSIA to 
grant immunity to current and former officials for any non-commercial conduct 
performed under color of foreign law would categorically preclude U.S. courts 
from exercising jurisdiction over certain claims against individuals present on 
U.S. territory, even in cases brought by U.S. citizens and, potentially, by the U.S. 
government.  
Determining the scope of conduct-based immunity is not a new problem, 
and applying the FSIA is not the proper solution. The fact that, in the thirty years 
since Filártiga,72 few courts have explicitly considered or granted conduct-based 
(as opposed to status-based) immunity to individual defendants for international 
law violations should not be taken to mean that lawyers and judges have been 
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missing the obvious. Rather, this relative silence is better interpreted as 
demonstrating a widespread understanding that individuals will not ordinarily be 
deemed immune from suit for certain types of conduct, and that any individual 
immunity that might exist does not come from the FSIA. Arguments based on 
logic, policy, and international law do not support a contrary result. 
